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Abstract 
Frequent bank failures in Nigeria, resulting in enormous losses of 
investments and jobs, have raised questions about the banks' compliance with 
the code of corporate governance. This single exploratory qualitative case 
study focused on the regulators of banks in Nigeria, the CBN, to find out the 
problems they may be encountering. Purposeful sampling was used to select 
25 participants, and data were collected through Semistructured interviews. 
The agency theory served as the conceptual framework. Findings showed that 
the CBN had put measures in place to ensure full compliance. Some of which 
included the installation of robust IT architecture, the recruitment of highly 
skilled IT personnel, in-depth monthly e-examinations of the banks, 
application of steep penalties, enforcement of the omnibus clause, and 
continuous staff training. Findings revealed in this paper show that the Central 
Bank of Nigeria had implemented several measures that would forestall future 
bank failures among Nigerian banks. 
Keywords: Compliance, Code of Corporate Governance, Regulators, and 
Nigerian Banks 
 
Introduction 
The issue of bank failures and liquidation has been a persistent 
problem in Nigeria since the emergence of the banks in 1892. Most of the 
pioneer banks failed because of mismanagement, shoddy reporting, and 
uncoordinated practices among the staff and the directors of the banks. The 
advent of the regulatory agency, the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, in 1959 
led to standardization in the banking sector (Omojiade, 2016).  
There was an improvement in the financial activities in the banking 
sector because the regulators paid more attention to the efficient running of 
organizations and highlighted the duties of the board members to the banks. 
The Nigerian banking system witnessed tremendous growth post until 2006 
when issues of distress started to occur. The CBN introduced the code of 
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corporate governance immediately to instill financial discipline in the system 
(Umanholen, 2015).  
As at that time, the paid-up capital of banks was $25m, which was 
quite low such that the inadequately capitalized Bank collapsed and folded up 
because of systemic shocks (Afolabi & Dare, 2015). Mergers and acquisitions, 
resulting in the consolidation of banks, started in 2006, and the minimum paid-
up capital of banks increased to $125 million (Nwagbara & Ugorji, 2015). As 
a result, the number of banks and discount houses operating in the country 
reduced to 25 from 87 (Ozili & Udiale, 2017). 
The 2008 global economic crisis harmed the Nigerian banks, and it led 
to yet another period of a near-collapse of the Nigerian economy. The 
regulators, the CBN, quickly intervened by injecting over $4.2 billion into the 
economy to forestall a systemic collapse (Umanholen, 2015). As a result, the 
regulators conducted another round of an in-depth appraisal of the activities 
of the banks. The amended code of corporate governance was released in 
2014. The revised code specified the duties of the directors, instituted stiff 
penalties for non-compliance with the code, and ensured uniformity in the 
reporting of financial affairs of the banking system (Ozili & Uadiale, 2017). 
Since then, the issue of bank liquidations and foreclosures has significantly 
reduced.  
Nigeria has the necessary framework to ensure a healthy banking 
industry. Still, inappropriate behavior and connivance between the staff of the 
regulatory agencies and directors of the banks frustrate full compliance with 
the codes of corporate governance (Omoijiade, 2016). Over 90% of the studies 
in the past had focused on the operators of the banking sector in Nigeria.  
The results have shown that the problems in the Nigerian banking 
sector arose from the fact that some banks do not fully comply with the code 
of corporate governance. It resulted in increased levels of irrecoverable loans. 
The banks also had weak capital adequacy ratios, and severe hardship to 
individual savers and depositors of the banks (Afolabi & Dare, 2015; 
Omoijiade, 2016; Ozili & Uiadiale, 2017)). 
In order to have a balanced view, there was a need to have an in-depth 
understanding of the issues associated with governance, especially from the 
perspective of the regulators (Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016; Ozili & Uadiale, 
2017; Umanholen, 2015). Understanding the problems associated with the 
Nigerian banks' inability to comply fully with the code of corporate 
governance from the perspective of the regulators may give a more profound 
understanding into how to curtail the incidence of bank failures and 
liquidations that are prevalent in Nigeria (Afolabi & Dare, 2015).  
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Research Question 
The research question for this qualitative exploratory case study was: 
RQ: Does the amended code of corporate governance 2014 affect the level of 
compliance by Nigerian banks?  
 
Data Collection and Data Analysis Plan 
 Twenty-five face-to-face interviews were conducted in the offices of 
the participants; the focus group interview was done in a quiet place in the 
premises of the CBN. The design of the interview questions ensured that the 
participants were not under any stress but could answer the items freely. 
Probes were necessary from time to time for clarity (Miles & Huber man, 
1994).  Each interview session lasted for about 30 minutes while the focus 
group interview lasted longer, for about 45minutes, to allow time for all 
members' make contributions. The data originating from the face-to-face 
meetings, focus group interviews, and document review was processed using 
the steps as suggested by (Yin, 2014). To answer the research question, the 
themes were collated. Then the interpretation, inferences, and 
recommendations followed. Because the bank regulators are busy people who 
rarely grant interviews, a field test was not conducted. Instead, the interview 
questions were scrutinized thoroughly to ensure open-endedness and non-
rigidity. 
 
Results from the Research 
Thirteen emergent themes emerged from the study. These themes 
include comprehensive supervision, recruitment of skilled personnel, e-
examination, board composition, and board meetings. Other themes include; 
special board committee, classification of banks, gray areas and self-
regulation, penalty review and sanction power, zero shareholder influence, the 
omnibus clause, defined duties of board members, right of stakeholders, and 
internal audit report.  
The two subthemes were the on-site and off-site investigation, and 
training and retraining. Most of the findings gave deeper insights into the 
current activities of the regulators. Some of the results obtained are at variance 
with the existing literature on the subject. Glaser and Laudel (2013) noted that 
a discrepant case is a data that is at variance with the perspective on the 
phenomenon being studied.  
The findings further showed that the amended code had opened some 
of the loopholes and other areas where the banks render unclear reports. 
Besides, the leaders of the Banking and Supervision Department in the CBN 
have reinvigorated the assessment methods in line with the global standards. 
The discussions on the findings are presented hereunder:  
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Table showing Triangulation of Data 
Triangulation of Data from Semistructured, Focus Group, and Document Review 
Codes Themes Subthemes No of 
occurrence 
Data source Percentage of 
occurrence 
Carrying out both 
on-site and off-
site supervision to  
ensure that bank 
comply with the 
code of corporate 
governance 
Comprehensive 
supervision 
On-site and 
off-site 
investigation 
25 Semistructured 
interview 
100% 
 
Making 
recruitment 
process 
transparent will 
enhance the 
recruitment of 
skilled personnel 
 
Recruitment of 
skilled personnel 
 
Training 
and 
retraining 
 
23 
 
Semistructured 
interview 
 
92% 
 
Conducting 
electronic 
examinations for 
banks improve the 
on-site and off-
site examinations 
for banks 
 
E-examination 
  
18 
 
Semistructured 
 
72% 
 
 
Codes 
 
 
Frequency of 
Board meeting 
should be 
encouraged for 
strategic 
discussion on the 
code of corporate 
governance 
 
 
 
Themes 
 
 
Board composition 
and board meetings 
 
 
Subthemes 
 
 
No of 
occurrence 
 
25 
 
 
Data source  
 
 
Semistructured 
interview 
 
 
Percentage 
of 
occurrence 
100% 
Special Board 
Committees that 
monitors that 
banks comply 
with the code of 
governance has 
helped in the past  
Special Board 
Committees 
 25 Semistructured 
Interview 
100% 
  
 
  
18 
  
72%  
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All banks must 
belong to a 
category such as 
low- risk, high- 
risk average risk, 
above average 
risk. 
Bank Classification Semistructured 
Interview 
 
Uniform rules and 
regulations 
introduced by 
CBN will provide 
self-regulation 
among all banks 
in Nigeria 
 
Gray Area and 
Self-Regulation 
  
16 
 
Semistructured 
Interview 
 
64% 
 
 
Codes 
 
 
The penalties for 
noncompliance 
with the code of 
corporate 
governance rule 
should be 
reviewed 
 
 
Themes 
 
 
Penalty Review 
 
 
Subthemes 
 
 
Sanctions 
 
 
No of 
occurrence 
 
17 
 
 
Data source  
 
 
Semistructured 
Interview 
 
 
Percentage 
of 
occurrence 
68% 
 
No shareholder 
should have 
majority votes or 
influence to 
determine the 
decisions made in 
the bank. 
 
Zero Shareholder 
Influence 
  
25 
 
Semistructured 
Interview 
 
100% 
 
The omnibus 
clause is in 
subsection 60 of 
BOFIA as 
amended 
 
Omnibus Clause 
  
16 
 
Semistructured 
Interview 
 
64% 
 
Defining the 
duties of every 
board member 
provide clarity to 
board members to 
know what is 
required for 
compliance with 
 
Defined Duties of 
the Board 
Members 
  
5 
 
Focus Group 
 
100% 
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the code of 
corporate 
governance 
 
Codes 
 
 
Every stakeholder 
of the bank has 
the right to 
freedom of 
expression and 
freedom to a 
meeting. The 
freedom of the 
bank should not 
be restricted by 
other stakeholder 
 
Themes           
 
 
Right of 
Stakeholders 
 No of 
occurrence 
 
5 
Data source  
 
                     
Focus Group 
 
Percentage of 
occurrence 
100% 
 
Audit Records 
reveals how bank 
comply with the 
codes or not 
 
Internal Audit 
Report/ Bullion 
Newsletter 
  
1 
 
Document 
Review 
 
100% 
 
Comprehensive Supervision 
Under the amended code, an annual comprehensive examination of the 
Bank and the subsidiaries is imperative. In the past, the weak financial position 
of some banks subsidiaries had negatively influenced the books of the parent 
bank. The situation had occurred in the past, whereby the adverse financial 
accounts of subsidiaries of some banks negatively affected the holding 
companies (Umaholen, 2015). The CBN now performs comprehensive 
examinations to confirm the soundness of banks' subsidiaries so that 
unexpected shocks from them do not ultimately lead to the collapse of the 
holding banks. 
 
Training and Retraining 
To ensure that the staff members imbibe global best practices, the CBN 
had intensified staff training. In-depth training is conducted on an on-going 
basis from time to time, both locally and offshore. The regulators now write 
examinations regularly, and only those that excelled in the studies remain in 
the department. The focus group interview further revealed that prior 
challenges of the incompetent workforce are being corrected through on-going 
extensive staff training 
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On and Offsite Examination 
In line with the need for a thorough examination as stipulated in the 
amended code, the CBN now carries out an in-depth monthly analysis of the 
books of the banks. It would appear that the situation not so in the past. A 
detailed inspection of banks was done only once in a year.  The monthly 
examination, called the off-site examination, is conducted when the banks 
download their returns to the central server of the CBN monthly. The IT 
Department of the CBN is now linked directly to the servers of the Nigerian 
banks so that live data are transmitted by the banks monthly, leaving no room 
for manipulation. The on-site examinations are examinations conducted on the 
premises of the banks (Omoijiade, 2016). On-site inspections are usually 
undertaken annually in the past. However, they are now held quarterly or semi-
annually depending on the classification of the Bank and if there is the need 
for an impromptu physical inspection of the books of the Bank. 
In the past, it appeared that banks keep two sets of accounts: the exact 
statements, which showed the precise position of the Bank, and another report, 
with falsified financials, for the auditors and the regulators (Umanholen, 
2015). It is therefore not surprising that a bank may suddenly be unable to 
meet its obligations only a short time after the regulators had conducted a 
routine examination and judged the Bank to be healthy (Osemeke & Adegbite, 
2016). 
As demonstrated in this paper, the recent introduction of e-
examination, or technology-based inspections, had curbed the deceptive 
practices used by banks. According to Leeming (2018), the use of technology 
in the banking industry has transformed and enhanced delivery channels and 
opened up new areas for users to conveniently access financial information. 
In addition, responses obtained revealed that the past problems 
associated with obtaining the correct financial positions of the banks from the 
balance sheet and the profit and loss positions have been resolved. The CBN 
does not have fictitious accounts any longer. The issues of late accounts 
submission have also been addressed. This is because the server of the CBN 
directly interfaces with the servers of all licensed banks in the country so there 
is no room for manipulation of accounts as may have been the case in the past. 
No doubt, this is a major achievement of the revised code. 
 
Recruitment of IT Personnel 
The CBN has recruited a large number of IT professionals, and they 
have been invaluable in providing a quick review of the monthly returns sent 
in by the banks. Since the servers of all the licensed banks are linked directly 
to the CBN, the system highlights observed discrepancies monthly, and 
regulators call for timely reconciliation before the situation deteriorates, 
failing which the affected Bank may be sanctioned. It must be noted that the 
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CBN had always conducted e-examinations of banks. Still, it may not have 
been as rigorous and in-depth as it is done currently because of the modern 
sophistication of the IT department.  
The participants' constant use of phrases like "that was in the past; it 
cannot happen again" points to the fact that the situation may have occurred 
in the past, but the era has passed, and the issue of rendering undetected 
fictitious accounts cannot happen again. Umanholen (2015) observed that in 
the past, regulators performed the annual comprehensive inspections of banks. 
Conducting the infrequent checks may have created room for the malpractices 
on the part of the banks (Ozili & Uadiale, 2017).  
 
Board Composition, Tenure and Board Meetings 
Under the amended code, the CBN has given directives to all banks on 
how often they are to conduct board meetings. The regulators also now review 
the minutes of the sessions to ensure compliance. In the past, banks hold the 
board meetings at the discretion of the chairperson or the managing director. 
Then, some bank owners and chief executive officers made their associates or 
family members directors. These directors would not challenge the actions 
taken by the banks (Ozili & Uadiale, 2017).  
As argued here, some aspects of the amended code had curtailed the 
overbearing influences of the directors and chairpersons of banks. The 
impunity on the part of bank directors and chairpersons contributed to past 
bank failures (Achim, Borlea, & Mare, 2016). The amended corporate 
governance code stipulated the maximum tenor for the directors on the boards 
of banks. 
A director could not spend more than three terms, or twelve years, on 
the board of any bank. The CEOs of the banks also have a shorter tenure of no 
more than ten years. In the past, the owners of banks stay on the board of banks 
for as long as possible. The stipulations of the amended code have now put an 
end to this. Again, this is a major achievement by the CBN. The code made a 
distinction between the position of board chairperson and managing director 
(CEO) such that no single individual can double as the CEO and chairperson, 
as was the case in the past. 
 
Creation of Special Board Committees 
The nature of special board committees has been of tremendous help 
to the banks, and it has simplified the on-site examination processes for the 
regulators. Some banks failed in the past because of illiquidity. The situation 
arose because they carried a large number of a sticky and irrecoverable risk-
asset portfolio (Omojiade, 2016). 
After the global economic crisis of 2008, many Nigerian banks became 
distressed (Afolabi & Dare, 2015), because most of them did not have the 
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internal mechanisms to ensure booking of high-quality credits (Saeid & 
Sakine, 2015). To forestall the steady deterioration of banks' assets and avert 
future Bank distresses, the amended law of corporate governance provided for 
the creation of two essential board committees in the Bank, which ensure that 
the banks the review risk portfolio and financial position of the banks 
continuously.  
These are the risk-asset and audit committees. The introduction of the 
committees has been of tremendous help in curtailing the excesses of the bank 
directors. The audit committee is statutory because the banks' auditors make 
use of this committee's report to audit the banks and prepare the yearly-
published accounts. Financial reporting is one significant indicator of an 
organization's accountability and transparency (Lau, Lu & Liang, 2016). The 
Credit committee ensures that the assets do not deteriorate to influence the 
profits of the banks negatively.  
The boards of banks now have a reasonable number of independent 
directors. Proponents of agency theory argue for a significant number of 
external and independent directors on the board of organizations to ensure 
thorough scrutiny of the books of the banks (Ozili & Uadiale, 2017). The 
independent directors also bring a wealth of experience to the banks (Twining; 
Heller; Nussbaum & Tsai 2017). 
 
Classification of Banks 
Unknown to the public, the CBN uses some parameters to classify the 
inherent risk of each Bank's portfolio. The CBN classifies the banks under four 
categories, namely, low-risk, high-risk, above average-risk, and moderate-
risk. Banks in the high-risk group are under the watchful eyes of the regulators, 
they do not have strong financials, and the shareholders' funds are almost 
eroded.  
The CBN recently changed the entire board and management of one of 
the banks in the high-risk group because the collapse of the Bank was 
imminent, and the shareholders could not inject additional funds to stabilize 
it. Banks classified under the above-average risk are also weak banks with 
weak financials, which are, however, slightly better than the high-risk banks. 
Moderate-risk banks are banks with sound financials and with a good credit 
portfolio.  
The best group is the low-risk group because the books of the banks in 
this category are well- managed and the financials are strong. Banks in the 
low-risk group are reliable, efficient, and they comply fully with the code of 
corporate governance. With the classification of the banks, the examiners' job 
is somewhat simplified because they can now devote more attention to the 
banks in the high-risk category. As a result, the CBN can quickly offer 
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intervention measures to salvage the situation and forestall public outcry to 
such banks. 
 
Gray Areas and Self-Regulation 
Findings revealed that the regulators had addressed the possible gray 
areas that the banks manipulated in the past. The respondents emphasized that 
there are no longer any lapses or gray areas on the regulatory examination of 
the banks by the CBN. The banks are now under intensive scrutiny by the 
regulators, and the directors do not want to tarnish their names. Accordingly, 
the banks have now imbibed self-regulatory measures in their activities.  
The CBN had recruited IT professionals who always scrutinize the 
books of the banks. They have been able to close all loopholes that the banks 
maneuver in the past. As demonstrated here, the amended code is explicit, 
detailed, and unambiguous so that the requirements from all parties are 
precise. 
 
Penalty Review and Sanction Power 
The enforcement of stringent penalties for non-compliance by the 
banks led to the sacking of bank directors lately. In the past, the penalties 
stipulated for non-compliance were too meager. The banks preferred to pay 
the penalties instead of complying with the code. Under the amended system, 
the sanctions have been reviewed upwards significantly, such that any 
payment of fine could have a substantial negative impact on the balance sheet 
of the Bank. 
 
Zero Shareholder Influence 
Findings revealed that the shareholders of the banks are not involved 
in the examination process and that they are not around when the regulators 
go in for routine inspections. The shareholders only attend the banks' annual 
general meetings after the CBN has approved their financial accounts. Under 
subsection 81 of CAMA, the shareholders of banks have the right to attend the 
annual general meetings to vote and ask the directors questions. 
Furthermore, the shareholders have rights to the banks' profits, as well 
as to inspect the registers of the banks' members. Under the amended code, no 
shareholder should have more than 5 percent equity in any bank, and, 
therefore, none of them has a controlling voice over the affairs of the Bank. 
 
Use of the Omnibus Clause 
The CBN Governor can rely on the omnibus clause contained in the 
amended code to issue out more stringent penalties to erring banks as the 
situation demand. Recently a bank paid over N200m because of this. The CBN 
governor now uses the omnibus clause to increase the applicable sanctions to 
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the banks whenever appropriate. The CBN governors did not apply the 
omnibus clause extensively used in the past. Because of the competition for 
dominance in the marketplace, banks do not want to do anything that might 
negatively affect their profits or their reputation, and they, therefore, make 
efforts to ensure compliance with the code of corporate governance. 
 
Recruitment of Staff from Commercial Banks 
Scholars argue that there may be gray areas in the code that the banks 
manipulate to suit their purposes (Afolabi & Dare, 2015; Umanholen, 2015). 
The results of this investigation confirmed this assertion. To mitigate this, the 
CBN had recruited staff from commercial banks that now assist in the 
regulatory activities by closing loopholes that could be exploited. 
Additionally, the past and current CBN governors are both former employees 
of commercial banks, and they have first-hand knowledge of the possible 
shortcomings of earlier code.  
 
Internal Audit Report 
The theme internal audit report emerged from the audit report 
document reviewed at the CBN during the data collection process. From the 
materials studied, it showed that CBN had included in the regulatory 
framework of the banks, an internal control system that would facilitate 
compliance with the code of corporate governance. Qussii and Taktak (2018) 
inferred that the presence of an audit system in the Bank is a measure of 
agreement with the rules and regulations set by the CBN. 
In summary, this research has revealed that the CBN, through the 
amended code of corporate governance, has put lasting measures in place to 
forestall future occurrences of bank failures in Nigeria.  
 
Potential Impact of this Research 
Implications for Practice 
The research findings have the potential contribution to the existing 
literature on the subject to shed more insight at the CBN's efforts in getting 
Nigerian banks to comply with the corporate code of governance and, in turn, 
to curb the incessant bank failures in Nigeria. A significant number of existing 
works of literature on the subject still shows that most of the Nigerian banks 
are not complying with the code of corporate governance because of 
regulatory ineptitude (Afolabi & Dare, 2015;  & Osemke & Adegbite, 2016;  
Renz,  Renz, Carrington &Terry, 2018; Umanholen, 2015). The findings show 
that many of the banks are now compliant since the CBN has put measures in 
place to ensure compliance. 
The research revealed that regulators have now tried to mitigate 
previous issues that contributed to bank failures, and that they are now well 
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prepared to curb the excesses of the Nigerian banks and forestall future bank 
foreclosures and liquidations. The study may assist the Federal Government 
of Nigeria and its policymakers in enacting laws that will make violations of 
the code of corporate governance punishable under the law (Nwagbara & 
Ugorji, 2015).  
 
Implications for Theory 
Leeming (2018) argued that, in line with agency theory, managers are 
expected to work in the best interests of the stakeholders. Bank managers carry 
out their duties efficiently to generate profit for the stakeholders, as mandated 
by law, and bank regulators ensure that the banks comply with all the 
requirements to provide stability in the banking sector. As demonstrated in 
this paper, the regulators have put mechanisms in place to ensure that the 
banks comply fully with the code of corporate governance, which, in turn, 
ensures that the banks operate smoothly and profitably to accommodate all 
stakeholders. To provide additional protection of the shareholders' funds, the 
CBN has directed the creation of the audit and credit committees to monitor 
the loan portfolios and profitability of the banks at all times.  
 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
Corporate governance enhances the financial performance of banks to 
provide a favorable financial standing that promotes economic growth (John 
& Obokoh, 2018). A viable banking sector fosters investors' confidence 
(Agyemang & Castellini, 2015). An efficient financial system encourages 
savings and deepens financial intermediation, which in turn creates increased 
domestic capital and investment activities (Leeming, 2018). There will 
resultantly be increased employment opportunities for the population 
(Agyemang, & Castellini, 2015), and bank failures and attendant staff 
retrenchments will be drastically reduced (Lau, Lu & Liang, 2016).  
As argued in this paper, the compliance level of Nigerian banks may 
have improved after the 2009 global crisis because of the various measures 
put in place by the CBN. 
Accordingly, the regulators firmly believe that the issues of a bank 
foreclosure and liquidation will not often occur in Nigeria. Therefore, the 
problem of staff reduction and layoffs with the attendant adverse effect on 
families and domestic activities will reduce. In general, the confidence of the 
Nigerian banking public in the sector will improve, leading to growth in 
savings activities and other developmental projects in the nation. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this qualitative, exploratory case study was to access 
the effect of the amended code of corporate governance 2014 on the level of 
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compliance of Nigerian banks while exploring the challenges confronting the 
CBN leaders in this regard. Findings confirmed that although the regulators in 
the past regularly supervised the banks, the monitoring might not have been 
comprehensive enough to detect problems in all the departments of the banks.  
The CBN has significantly improved the bank examination process 
and has implemented several measures that will ensure that the banks fully 
comply. In addition to the on-site examination, the regulators now rigorously 
monitor the bank monthly through the off-site supervision that allows for the 
collection of data from the servers of banks, leaving no room for no possibility 
of record falsification as was rampant in the past. There has been the massive 
recruitment of professionals, particularly IT experts, who examine the banks’ 
returns and call for immediate reconciliation when discrepancies are noticed. 
The CBN has also gone ahead and recruited staff from commercial banks that 
have brought in their experiences to further boost the examination processes. 
In the past, the penalties for an infraction of the code of corporate 
governance are soft, and the banks can pay without difficulty and continue to 
circumvent the code (Ekhator & Anyiwe, 2016). However, the CBN governor 
now relies on an omnibus clause in the code that allows for severe sanctions 
on the banks for any infraction.  
As the banker of last resort, the CBN is set to regain the public trust in 
the Nigerian banking sector. Rather than allow a bank to become distressed, 
the regulators would pump in additional funds and change the bank’s 
management and board. To date, 2 banks boards have been affected. The era 
when a single individual would own the controlling interest in a bank is over. 
In line with the code, no single individual can own more than five percent of 
the paid-up capital of any bank. Directors of the banks are also under the 
watchful eyes of the regulators and held accountable for any problems within 
the banks. The CBN continually trains the staff to adapt to constant changes 
and challenges in the marketplace.  
Continuous and effective monitoring of the measures put in place will 
adequately ensure that the banks comply fully with the code. If the CBN 
succeeds, then the problems encountered by the regulators will have been 
mitigated, and the era of bank failures in Nigeria will be outdated.   
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